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THE EFFICIENCY THEORY OF CAUSATION AND
RESPONSIBILITY: UNSCIENTIFIC FORMALISM
AND FALSE SEMANTICS
RICHARD W. WRIGHT*
In his article, Robert Cooter asserts that the efficiency theory of tort
law is consistent with the traditional corrective-justice, rights-based view
of tort liability. More particularly, he claims that the efficiency theory is
consistent with the causation requirement in tort law, according to which
a defendant is not held liable unless her tortious conduct caused injury to
the plaintiff's rights in his person or property.' I have argued that the
efficiency theory is fundamentally inconsistent with both the traditional
view of tort liability and the causation requirement that is a central part
of that view. 2
In this comment, I intend to demonstrate that the claims of Cooter
and the other legal economists are built on an habitual confusion over
and misuse of fundamental concepts. As this symposium indicates, the
confusion is not limited to the legal economists, although they have done
more than anyone else in recent years to maintain and expand the confu-
sion. Since I have much ground to cover, I must be succinct. I hope that
readers will refer to the sources that I cite for more thorough develop-
ment of the various points.
I. DISTINGUISHING CAUSATION FROM RESPONSIBILITY
Cooter recognizes that the traditional conception of tort law is that
it is a system of liability based on individual autonomy and individual
responsibility. But he erroneously assumes that the dividing line between
individual autonomy and individual responsibility is marked solely by
causation of injury to the person or property of others.3
Cooter and others have been misled on this point by a too literal
reading of some statements by H.L.A. Hart, Tony Honor6, and Richard
* Associate Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.S. 1968, California Insti-
tute of Technology; J.D. 1973, Loyola University, Los Angeles; LL.M. 1976, Harvard University. I
have benefitted from comments by Sheldon Nahmod and Stewart Sterk.
I. Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency.- An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 523, 524-25 (1987) (Professor Cooter's article appears in this symposium issue.).
2. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Bane].
3. Cooter, supra note 1, at 524.
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Epstein. 4 Hart, Honor6, and Epstein in turn have been misled by a su-
perficial analysis of ordinary language. They assume that, because we
often use the phrases "proximate cause," "legal cause," or "the cause" to
identify a factor which has been singled out for legal liability, causation is
equivalent to responsibility. 5 They fail to note that the emphasis in these
phrases is on the words "proximate," "legal," and "the," respectively,
rather than on the word "cause." The phrases are merely elliptical ways
of saying that, out of all the contributing factors (causes), the selected
factor is judged to be "the (proximate, legal, or responsible) cause."
When we want to emphasize causation per se, we ordinarily use the
phrase "a cause" rather than "the cause," although sometimes even the
phrase "a cause" is used elliptically to denote a responsible cause. 6
Responsibility in tort law is based on three distinct but intercon-
nected inquiries. The first inquiry is the tortious-conduct inquiry. Did
the defendant behave tortiously (for example, intentionally, negligently,
or by creating an ultrahazardous situation or a defective product)? The
second inquiry is the actual-causation inquiry. Did the tortious aspect of
the defendant's conduct contribute to an injury to the plaintiff's person
or property? The third inquiry is the so-called "proximate-cause" in-
quiry. Are there any principles which would absolve the defendant of
liability despite her tortious causation of the injury? Only the second
inquiry, the actual-causation inquiry, is a causal inquiry. The first and
third inquiries use noncausal principles to select the responsible cause(s)
from all the other causes. Only tortious causes will be held responsible
(hence the tortious-conduct inquiry), and even tortious causes may be
absolved from liability as a result of noncausal principles embodied in the
so-called proximate-cause inquiry. 7
Cooter acknowledges the distinction between the actual-causation
(cause-in-fact) inquiry and the proximate-cause inquiry, but, like every
other legal economist, he treats both as causal inquiries and therefore
4. H.L.A. HART & T. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW lxxvii-lxxxi, 65-67, 302 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter HART & HONORIf]; Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
163, 168-69 (1973) (causation of harm results in prima facie liability); see Cooter, supra note 1, at
526.
5. See sources cited supra note 4; accord Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 60, 62-67 (1956). For criticism of the arguments made by Hart, Honor6, Epstein, and Malone,
see Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1741-58, 1792, 1807-13 (1985) [herein-
after Wright, Causation].
6. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1741-50; R. Wright, Pruning the Bramble Bush by
Clarifying the Concepts: Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Stan-
dards of Proof §§ 11(A) & II(B) (October 1987) (unpublished manuscript, lIT Chicago-Kent College
of Law) [hereinafter Wright, Bramble Bush].
7. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1741-50, 1759-74 & n.161; Wright, Bramble Bush,
supra note 6, §§ HI(A) & It(B).
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confuses the causation issue with the responsibility issue. 8 He recites a
Mother Goose verse which states that a kingdom would not have been
lost (through a series of steps) if not for the want of a horseshoe nail. He
then asserts that "the conclusion that the downfall of the kingdom was
caused by the want of a horseshoe nail is absurd." 9 The conclusion is
absurd only if the issue is whether the want of the nail should be treated
as the (or a) significant or responsible cause, which clearly is the issue
that Cooter has in mind-the proximate-cause or responsibility issue. If
the issue instead were the actual-causation issue-whether the want of
the nail contributed to (was one of the many causes of) the downfall of
the kingdom-it would be absurd to conclude that the want of the nail
was not a cause, since the kingdom would not have been lost if the nail
had not been missing. Thus, Cooter's discussion of the "decaying transi-
tivity" of causation misses the point. Responsibility, not causation, has
possibly decayed as the causal chain lengthened.' 0
II. THE CONCEPT OF CAUSATION
Cooter and other legal economists like to portray the efficiency the-
ory as a scientific advance in dealing with tort liability issues, as con-
trasted with the allegedly unscientific nature of other views, including the
traditional corrective-justice view."I Cooter contrasts the intuitive ap-
proach to causation in the traditional view with the formal mathematical
treatment of functional relationships in the efficiency view.12 But it is the
efficiency view, rather than the traditional view, which is unscientific and
unrealistic.
Cooter asserts that the courts' causal determinations are based on
direct observation of causation between events, with no reference to any
causal law or generalization.' 3 As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the
8. Cooter, supra note 1, at 525, 528-31; accord Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 70-73, 105-08 (1975); Landes &
Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 109-11 (1983);
Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework, 15 GA. L. REV. 1007
(1981); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980); Schwartz, Causation in Private Tort Law. A Comment on Kelman, 63
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 639, 639-40, 641-43, 645 & n.14 (1987) (Professor Schwartz's article appears in
this symposium issue.); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Low of
Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 463-64, 466-70 (1980).
9. Cooter, supra note 1, at 528.
10. Id. at 529. Responsibility no doubt would be found if the nail was removed intentionally to
prevent delivery of a message which would have turned around the critical battle.
11. E.g., Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851,
851-56 (1981).
12. Cooter, supra note 1, at 523-24, 530-31, 541-42 & n.54.
13. Id. at 542.
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intuitive, unelaborated concept of causation applied by the courts is the
concept embodied in the NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set)
test, which is based on the dominant regularity account of causation that
was developed by Hume and Mill. The major thesis of this account is a
rejection of the notion that there are causal forces or qualities which can
be directly observed and an insistence that singular causal judgments
consist precisely in the belief that a certain sequence of events instantiates
one or more causal laws. A causal law (Hempel's "covering law") lists
all the antecedent conditions which together are minimally sufficient for
the consequence (hence the NESS test). 14
Cooter argues that, if any generalizations are used by the courts,
they "are so commonplace that cause is said to be observed, not de-
duced."1 5 He contrasts legal and historical explanations, which allegedly
do not invoke generalizations or at most use unhelpful platitudes, with
scientific explanations, which clearly do rely on generalizations. Cooter
has been misled by writers, including Hart and Honor6, who think that
the distinction between scientific explanations on the one hand and legal
or historical explanations on the other is a causal distinction. It is not.
The distinction is based on lawyers' and historians' need to identify the
legally responsible or historically significant cause(s), respectively, which
is a proximate-cause issue rather than a causal issue. Hart and Honor6
acknowledge that legal explanations, as well as scientific explanations,
invoke causal generalizations of just the sort that Cooter dismisses. 16
Cooter begins his discussion of the "plain meaning" of cause with
the superficial analysis of ordinary language, described above, which
leads to a confusion of the concepts of causation and responsibility.
Although he notes that causal attribution seems to be a factual issue
while attribution of responsibility seems to be a normative issue, he erro-
neously treats Hart and Honor6's and Epstein's theories of responsibility,
which allegedly make causation decisive for liability, as theories of causa-
tion. 17 He also considers the but-for test, which he rejects since it fails in
the overdetermined-causation cases. '8
Finally, Cooter reaches the NESS test. He cites John Mackie's
"INUS" (Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient
14. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1784-1813.
15. Cooter, supra note 1, at 542.
16. Id. at 542 n.54; HART & HONORt, supra note 4, at 9-22, 24-25,- 44-49, criticized in J.
MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION ix-x, 63-76, 117-32 (rev. ed.
1980); see supra text accompanying notes 4-10. See generally D. PAPINEAU, FOR SCIENCE IN THE
SOCIAL. SCIENCES (1978); Marc-Wogeau, On Historical Explanation, 28 THEORIA 15 (1962).
17. Cooter, supra note 1, at 526; see supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
18. Cooter, supra note 1, at 526-27; see infra text accompanying notes 96-99.
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condition) formulation of the test.19 Although he admits that this test is
more convincing than the but-for test, and that there "are apparently
scholars who believe that some such analysis will provide the best expla-
nation of causation in torts," he declines to explore the alleged "para-
doxes and problems" of this approach, preferring instead to indicate why
he thinks the efficiency theory is "more promising":
20
Drawing the boundary [between freedom and responsibility] involves
questions about liberty and efficiency. For judges to debate these ques-
tions, there must be language that is neutral in the sense that alterna-
tive conceptions of liberty and efficiency can be described without bias.
The debate cannot be decided by the meaning of the basic terms in
which it is conducted. To be specific, an analysis of the meaning of
"cause" in plain speech, as applied to tort cases, cannot decide the
issues facing judges. Rather, an analysis of meaning accomplishes the
more modest task of increasing the clarity of expression by the differ-
ent sides in the debate. Plain speech theories should clarify issues of
causation, not foreclose them. Deciding issues of causation in tort law
requires appeal to substantive values like liberty and efficiency. 2 1
To decipher this paragraph, one must recognize that Cooter is using
the words "cause" and "causation" to refer to the issue of ultimate re-
sponsibility. Cooter's main point is that issues of responsibility cannot be
resolved by an analysis of the meaning of ordinary statements used to
attribute responsibility, particularly statements using causal language.
But what better evidence is there of general attitudes regarding responsi-
bility? The principles of responsibility can only be determined through a
careful analysis of the context in which particular attributions of respon-
sibility are made. The danger with this approach, which Cooter (follow-
ing Hart, Honor6, and Epstein) fails to avoid, is that one may engage in a
superficial analysis of the meaning of ordinary language that confuses
statements on causation-per-se with statements that use elliptical causal
language to identify a responsible cause, thereby confusing the concepts
19. Cooter, supra note 1, at 527 & n.13, citing Mackie, Causes and Conditions, 2 AM. PHIL. Q.
245, 245-47 (1965). Cooter also acknowledges Hart and Honori's earlier NESS formulation.
Cooter, supra, at 527 n.13.
20. Cooter, supra note 1, at 527-28 (citations omitted). Cooter states that "'It is possible to
contrive still more subtle and complicated combinations of logical operators that are even more
convincing." Id. at 527-28. He suggests that it would be interesting "'to define a logical operator
called 'cause' and develop the rules by which it joins variables. This is a more rigorous, formal
approach than concatenating necessity and sufficiency." Id. at 528 n.14. He does not indicate why
using a "logical operator" called "'cause" would be more -rigorous" or "formal" than relying on
familiar logical operators such as necessity and sufficiency. Moreover, the causal relationship is an
empirical one, in which necessity and sufficiency are empirically contingent facts, rather than a
purely logical one. HART & HONOR(. supra note 4, at 14-15, 114; J. MACKIE, supra note 16, at 10-
17, 21, 32, 214-16.
21. Cooter, supra note 1, at 528.
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of causation and responsibility. 22 It is Cooter's unsupported assumption
that the issue of responsibility involves "questions about liberty and effi-
ciency" that introduces a bias into the debate.
I have argued that a realistic, rather than superficial, analysis of the
meaning of attributive statements reveals that causation-per-se, as em-
bodied in the NESS test, is treated as an essential element (along with the
tortious-conduct and proximate-cause inquiries) for legal responsibility. 23
To show that the efficiency theory is "more promising," Cooter must
demonstrate that my analysis is invalid and that a proper analysis vali-
dates the efficiency theory. He has done neither. With respect to my
analysis, he refers vaguely to alleged "paradoxes and problems" that
have been raised by Michael Moore. 24 With respect to the efficiency the-
ory, he makes the legal economists' familiar mistake of confusing actual
causation with mere increased risk.
To support this last statement, I must explain the distinctions
among causal laws, causal generalizations, and actual instances of causa-
tion, which have been ignored by the legal economists (and others). A
causal law, which is stated in abstract universal form, lists the set of ante-
cedent conditions which are minimally sufficient for the occurrence of
the result. The antecedent conditions and the result are described as ab-
stract types, which cannot in themselves cause anything. For example, a
causal law might abstractly state that "a blow of a certain force" (with-
out designating any actual blow), when "applied in a certain manner"
(without designating any actual application) to "a box constructed in a
certain way" (without designating any actual box) is sufficient for "a flat-
tening of the box" (without designating any actual flattening). The type-
description, "a blow of a certain force," is an abstract concept which
cannot in itself cause anything.
An actual singular instance of causation consists of the complete,
concrete instantiation of a causal law on a particular occasion. Each ac-
tual antecedent condition which is a part of this complete instantiation of
the causal law is a (NESS) cause of the instantiated result. But it is a
cause only if the causal law is completely instantiated, that is, if all the
other abstract antecedent conditions and the abstract result listed in the
causal law also were instantiated. 25 For example, an actual instance of
22. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
23. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, passim; see supra text accompanying note 7.
24. Cooter, supra note 1, at 528 & n.16. For my discussion of questions raised in this sympo-
sium by Moore, Mark Kelman, Alan Schwartz, and Judith Thomson, see Wright, Bramble Bush,
supra note 6, pt. III & § IV(C).
25. J. MACKIE, supra note 16, at 260-67. Although Cooter says that a cause which is identified
in this manner is called a "prospective" cause, this term instead has been used (invalidly) to refer to
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causation occurs when an actual blow of the specified force is actually
applied in the specified manner to an actual box constructed in the speci-
fied way and results in an actual flattening of the specified type.
In the real world of imperfect knowledge, we use causal generaliza-
tions, which are incompletely specified causal laws that list only some,
not all, of the abstract antecedent conditions that would be found in the
fully specified causal laws-for example, "hitting a person on the nose
(often) causes the nose to bleed." When we assert that a particular actual
antecedent condition (an actual hitting of a person's nose) was a cause of
some actual result (an actual bleeding of the nose), we are asserting
(1) that the actual antecedent condition and the actual result instantiate
an abstract antecedent condition and the abstract result listed in some
causal generalization, (2) that all the other abstract antecedent condi-
tions, if any, listed in the causal generalization also have been instanti-
ated (or at least that there is no reason to believe that they have not), and
(3) that all the unknown abstract antecedent conditions which complete
the causal law (for example, the required force of the blow, the fragility
of the nose, and the lack of other causal mechanisms which would coinci-
dentally produce a nose bleed immediately prior to the blow) also must
have been instantiated. The third assertion, which is critical, is an infer-
ence drawn from the sufficiently high probability that this particular
causal generalization is applicable in the specific circumstances and the
sufficiently low probability that any competing causal generalization is
applicable.26
The courts, relying on their intuitive knowledge of the concept of
causation, have fashioned evidentiary standards that require proof of
these three assertions. First, in order to prove that a certain condition
was a cause of a certain result, it obviously must be established that the
condition and the result both actually occurred and that there is some
causal generalization that links conditions of the type that occurred to
results of the type that occurred. Second, proof of causation will be
strengthened to the extent that it can be established that other conditions
known to be part of the causal generalization also actually occurred,
while the proof will fail if it is established that some required condition
did not exist. Third, the courts insist that it is not sufficient to prove that
a certain condition made it more likely that a certain result would occur,
conditions which merely increase the ex ante risk of some result. Cooter, supra note 1, at 542 n.53;
Shavell, supra note 8, at 466-68, cited in Cooter, supra, at 534 n.32.
26. HART & HONORI, supra note 4, at 10-11, 31-32, 44-49; J. MACKIE, supra note 16, at 63-80;
Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 6, § IV(B); see Papineau, Probabilities and Causes, 82 J. PHIL. 57
(1985).
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or that there is some possibility that the condition was a cause of the
result. Other plausible causal explanations must be distinguished before
it is appropriate to conclude that this condition actually was a cause of
the result. 27
Cooter and the other legal economists apply the term "probabilistic
cause," or one of its variants, to an actual condition which merely in-
creases the probability that some result will occur.28 Thus, the only defi-
nite requirement for a "probabilistic cause" is that it be an instantiation
of one of the abstract conditions that is linked to the abstract result in a
causal generalization (half of step one). It is not required that the ab-
stract result be instantiated (the other half of step one), although it is
often assumed that it has been. It is not required that there be sufficient
evidence that the other abstract conditions have been instantiated (step
two). Finally, it is not required that other plausible causal generaliza-
tions be distinguished (step three). Hence, proof that an actual condition
was a "probabilistic cause" of some result is at most only proof that it
increased the risk or probability of the result's occurring. It is not proof
that it was a cause of the result itself (especially when the result has not
even occurred!). The legal economists, and others who use the term
"probabilistic cause," are confusing ex ante or ex post analysis of in-
creased risk with ex post proof of actual causation.
Cooter carries the confusion two steps further. He assumes that the
values of the independent variables in any functional relationship are
"causes" of the value of the dependent variable. 29 It is not appropriate to
use causal terminology at all unless the functional relationship represents
an empirically contingent relationship-for example, a multi-valued
causal generalization linking different abstract types and levels of precau-
tion and harm-rather than a purely logical or mathematical relation-
ship. 30 Moreover, even if the functional relationship represents a multi-
valued causal generalization of the sort described, the abstract values of
the independent variables (which are different abstract levels of precau-
tion) are not "causes" of the abstract values of the dependent variable
(which are different abstract levels of harm). Only a concrete instantia-
tion of an abstract antecedent condition (an actual level of precaution in
27. See generally 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, JR. & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at 93-
101 & n.8, 108-10 & nn.43, 44 & 49 (2d ed. 1986).
28. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 71-72, 73-74, 78, 84-85 (causal linkage); Cooter, supra note 1, at
534 & n.32 (probabilistic cause), 541, 543-44 (material cause); Rizzo, supra note 8, at 1009-16 (prob-
abilistic causation); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 640, 645 & n.14 (probabilistic cause); Shavell, supra
note 8, at 466, 468-69 & n.17 (probabilistic cause).
29. Cooter, supra note 1, at 541.
30. See supra note 20.
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a certain instance) can be a cause. It is a cause of the result itself only if
the abstract result and all the other abstract antecedent conditions in the
causal law that underlies the particular causal generalization also have
been instantiated.
The legal economists' treatment of a "probabilistic cause" as a cause
of the result itself, rather than (at most) a cause of an increased risk of
the result's occurring, is only one example of the hollowness of their
claim to be the servants of science and legal realism. It is true that, in
order to present the appearance of scientific progress, rigor, and credibil-
ity, "the mathematical mode ... has become the norm in the economic
analysis of tort law."' 3' Yet mathematics per se is not science, and the
legal economists' mathematical apparatus, like their concept of "proba-
bilistic causation," is a sham. Contrary to Cooter's assertion, the legal
economists' functional notations are not "explicit mathematical expres-
sions" which "precisely describe" causal relationships, nor do the econo-
mists use these functions to derive efficient rules or efficient levels of
care. 32 Instead, they assume a functional relationship, but they never fill
it out with a mathematical description of any specific causal generaliza-
tion. Similarly, they define the efficient level of precaution as the level
that would minimize the social costs, but they never actually derive such
an efficient level by mathematically manipulating precisely described
causal generalizations. 33
Instead, when the legal economists discuss actual cases, they use
common (and uncommon) generalizations similar to those that Cooter
has dismissed. 34 But for the efficiency theory, unlike the traditional cor-
rective-justice theory, this is not adequate, since the efficiency theory de-
pends on precise identification of the efficient levels of activity and care,
which in turn requires precise mathematical descriptions of all the
risks. 35 Thus, contrary to Schwartz's claim, the efficiency theory of tort
law, even if it made sense normatively and analytically, could not be im-
plemented due to insuperable empirical problems. 36
31. Cooter, supra note 1, at 533.
32. Id. at 534, 551.
33. Eg., id. at 533-35, 541-42. The mathematical proofs that are attempted (on abstract effi-
cient rules rather than real ones with actual efficient levels of care) often rely on erroneous assump-
tions and frequently exhibit faulty mathematical reasoning. See the discussion in Wright, Bane,
supra note 2, at 444-49, 452-54 & nn.51, 52, 58 & 67.
34. E.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 120-22 & n.28; Landes & Posner, supra note 1I, at
889-916; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 52-73 (1972).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
36. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 647-49; see Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation
Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 587-89, 617-26 (1987) (Professor
Kelman's article appears in this symposium issue.); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 641 (1980).
561
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In sum, Cooter's opening and closing references to the disappear-
ance of cause from science and from the efficiency theory of torts are
misleading. 37 As Cooter himself admits, the functional relationships
used in science are mathematical descriptions of causal generalizations, 38
with much more content and precision than the empty formulas of the
legal economists. The legal economists themselves, including Cooter, as-
sume that the functional relationships that they use represent causal gen-
eralizations. 39 However, it is true that causation per se-identification of
actual instances of causation-is missing from the efficiency theory. As a
supposed account of causation in general and the causation requirement
in tort law in particular, this is neither scientific progress nor legal real-
ism, but rather the reverse of each.
III. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF LIBERTY AND EFFICIENCY
Cooter, like other legal economists, states that the normative foun-
dation of the efficiency theory of tort law is the concept of Pareto effi-
ciency, according to which one allocation of resources is considered to be
more efficient than (and hence preferred to) a second allocation only if
someone is better off and no one is worse off under the first compared to
the second. He asserts that opponents of the efficiency theory have failed
to notice the alleged "natural link between liberty and Pareto effi-
ciency." 40 To the contrary, opponents of the efficiency theory have noted
and rejected the alleged link.4 1
The alleged link is premised on the notion that liberty is protected
under the Pareto criterion since, given the requirement that no one be
made worse off, no reallocation of resources is permissible without the
consent of the parties involved. 42 But the Pareto criterion would permit
(indeed require) coercive reallocations without actual consent, as long as
at least one person is better off and no one is worse off, and it would not
require consent for any particular division of the net gain. 43 More im-
37. Cooter, supra note 1, at 523, 551; see id. at 541.
38. Id. at 523, 541-42 & n.54. Functional relationships in science are simply mathematically
quantified statements of causal laws or generalizations, which often are written in terms of time-
based derivatives of the regularities of change and succession which we commonly think of as causal
laws. In the 75 years that have passed since Russell made his provocative statement, causation
continues to be a vigorous concept in science as well as in law. J. MACKIE, supra note 16, at 143-48,
153-54; see D. PAPINEAU, supra note 16, at 5 & n.3 and the sources cited therein.
39. Cooter, supra note 1, at 541-42.
40. Id. at 524; see id. at 547.
41. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 531-33,
540-48 (1980); Dworkin, Why Efficiency? 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 563, 573-84 (1980).
42. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudica-
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488-490 (1980).
43. R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 63-65 (1974); Coleman, supra note 41, at 533.
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portantly, if, as assumed, the Pareto criterion is employed restrictively to
prohibit any reallocation unless it would be a Pareto improvement, the
liberty thereby protected would be similar to the unappealing absolute
rights in person and property that are espoused by the libertarians. 44 The
libertarian theory of rights and liability is inconsistent with the tradi-
tional corrective-justice view that is followed by the courts, 45 which
Cooter and the other legal economists purport to be explaining.
In any event, the legal economists' appeal to the Pareto criterion is
spurious. Contrary to Cooter's claim, the foundation of the efficiency
theory of law (and all of modern policy-oriented economics) is not the
Pareto criterion, but rather the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. As Cooter ad-
mits, the Pareto criterion is useless in practice, since its conditions rarely
if ever could be met. Thus, the legal economists shift to the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion, which states that one allocation is more efficient than
(and hence preferred to) a second if the winners win more than the losers
lose, so that in theory (and ignoring transaction costs) the winners could
compensate the losers and no one would be worse off. However, no com-
pensation is actually required.46  Thus, it is not only misleading, but
downright wrong, to refer to a change ratified by this second criterion as
a "hypothetical Pareto improvement ' 47 or, worse yet, as a "Pareto im-
provement."' 48 An essential condition for a Pareto improvement is that
no one be made worse off. This condition gives the Pareto criterion what
little normative appeal it has. It is precisely this condition that is
dropped by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion must be justified independently of the
Pareto criterion (which itself is normatively flawed). Cooter, like almost
all other legal economists, does not attempt to do so. The few who have
attempted to justify the Kaldor-Hicks criterion have understandably de-
clined to rely explicitly on utilitarian arguments, given the notorious
44. See infra text accompanying note 66; B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROP-
ERTY xi-xiii (1975). On the other hand, if the Pareto criterion is used affirmatively only, to support
Pareto improvements, but is silent on the choice between two allocations when neither is Pareto-
superior to the other, then there is no link between liberty and Pareto efficiency.
45. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1750-58; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 6, § II(C).
46. Cooter, supra note 1, at 547-48; see Hanks, On a Just Measure of the Efficiency of Law and
Governmental Policies, 8 CAROozo L. REV. 1 (1986) (argues should take transaction costs into
account).
47. Cooter, supra note 1, at 548; see G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBIn-r, TRAGIC CHOICES 85-86
(1978) ("potential Pareto superiority"); A.M. POIANSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW ANi) ECo-
NOMICs 7 n.4 (1983) (alleges all results derived under "more intuitive" Kaldor-Hicks criterion can
also be derived under Pareto criterion); Posner, supra note 42, at 491 ("Potential Pareto
Superiority").
48. Cooter, supra note I, at 524.
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weaknesses in those arguments. 49 Instead, they have argued that the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is justified by the hypothetical "implied consent"
or the hypothetical "ex ante compensation" of the losers, who suppos-
edly are better off overall under a world subject to the Kaldor-Hicks cri-
terion.50 But hypothetical consent and hypothetical compensation are no
more real consent or real compensation than a hypothetical Pareto im-
provement is a real Pareto improvement. 51
Cooter, like many other legal economists, also shifts back and forth
between utility and wealth as the measure of value under the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion. 52 Utility has the advantage of being something (pleasure
or happiness) which seems to have intrinsic worth, while wealth only has
a derivative, instrumental value as a means of obtaining something else
(such as happiness). Yet, as Cooter and the other legal economists recog-
nize, there is no scale which can be used to make interpersonal compari-
sons of utility, as required by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. They therefore
shift to values based on an individual's wealth-what she is willing and
able to pay for a good-and they assume (invalidly) that market prices
reflect willingness-to-pay.5 3
This move raises a host of technical and normative problems that,
once again, Cooter and almost all other legal economists simply ignore.54
An obvious normative problem is that, even as individuals, few of us
adopt maximization of our private wealth (measured by the market price
of our resources) as our sole or even dominant goal. And surely none of
us is particularly concerned with, much less thinks that the basic norma-
tive principle should be, maximization of aggregate social wealth, with no
49. E.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 110-117
(1979). Posner's claim that his wealth-maximization theory avoids the problems of the utilitarian
theory does not hold up. Coleman, supra note 41, at 520-30 & n.28; Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 205-16 (1980); Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U.
TORONTO L.J. 307 (1980).
50. E.g., Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. EcON. 407 (1972); Posner, supra
note 42, at 488-502.
51. Coleman, supra note 41, at 533-40; Dworkin, supra note 41, at 573-84.
52. Cooter, supra note 1, at 524, 535, 541, 543, 548-49, 550; see S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 2-3, 5-8 & n.2 (1987) (assumes subjective utilities can be calculated and
compared); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 2-15, 19-20 (1960) (assumes subjec-
tive utilities are fully expressed in market transactions); Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple
Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 521 (1980) (assume utility equals
wealth); Rubin, Predictability and the Economic Approach to Law: A Comment on Rizzo, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 319, 323, 327, 333 (1980) (moves without explanation from utility to willingness-to-pay to
market prices).
53. Cooter, supra note I, at 548-49, 550; see R. Wright, The Failure of the Economic Theories
of Tort 7-10 (September 1987) (unpublished manuscript, 1IT Chicago-Kent College of Law) [herein-
after Wright, Economic Theories].
54. Wright, Economic Theories, supra note 53, at 7-10.
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regard for individual rights or how that wealth is distributed. 55 Yet that
is the principle embodied in the Kaldor-Hicks criterion with values based
on willingness-to-pay or market prices. The palpable unattractiveness of
this principle perhaps explains the legal economists' continued resort to
the concept of utility, despite their recognition that they must abandon
the concept of utility to get their theories off the ground. Although utili-
tarianism (maximization of aggregate social utility) is an unattractive
normative principle, it is much more attractive than wealth-
maximization.56
Cooter, unlike most other legal economists, is sensitive to these con-
cerns. Hence, he quickly concedes that efficiency theory cannot and
should not be used to define the initial distribution of rights.5 7 If utility is
the measure of value, we can imagine people having a complete set of
preferences without as yet having any rights, but we cannot determine
who would get the greatest utility from being assigned various rights
since interpersonal comparisons of utility are not possible. 58 If willing-
ness-to-pay is the measure of value, an initial distribution of rights must
be specified before we can measure how much any individual is willing
and able to pay for anything. 59
Cooter also states that for two distinct reasons, the first
noneconomic and the second economic, the initial distribution of rights
must be immune from nonconsensual redistribution through the effi-
ciency analysis. First, he notes the normative implausibility of Posner's
claim that efficiency analysis should be used to allocate basic tort rights,
even if technically it were possible to do So. 60 Second, he recognizes that
efficiency analysis cannot be applied to those redistributions which would
have a large impact on individuals' income or wealth, since such redistri-
butions would affect prices and thus render the before-and-after compari-
son of wealth incoherent. 6 1 He initially applies these insights to the right
to bodily integrity, but subsequently extends them to all of a person's
rights in her person or property. 62 This extension seems especially neces-
sary for tort law, since tort injuries usually involve serious physical or
economic harm.
55. Dworkin, supra note 49, at 194-205.
56. Coleman, supra note 41, at 526-30; Weinrib, supra note 49.
57. Cooter, supra note 1, at 524-25, 544-47, 551.
58. The Scitovsky Paradox also would have to be overcome. Coleman, supra note 41, at 519 &
n. 14.
59. Cooter, supra note 1, at 547-49; Coleman, supra note 41, at 524-25.
60. Cooter, supra note 1, at 545-47 (criticizing Posner, supra note 49, at 125-27).
61. Cooter, supra note 1, at 548-49 & n.60; Coleman, supra note 41, at 525-26.
62. Cooter, supra note 1, at 541-49.
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At this point, Cooter has conceded more than he realizes. He has
acknowledged that the rights that we have in our persons and property
are defined by noneconomic principles, which are prior to and limit any
efficiency analysis. But, like other legal economists before him, he as-
sumes that these noneconomic principles and rights leave room for an
efficiency analysis. 63 More particularly, he assumes that we can and
should "maximize the value of these basic rights" by using the Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency criterion to select liability rules, damage rules, and other
tort rules to protect and adjust these rights in particular situations,
thereby achieving the "union of liberty and efficiency." 64 This notion
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of the concepts of liberty and
rights.
The rights that we have in our persons and property are constituted
by the rules that specify the sorts of actions against which we are pro-
tected, the types of harm for which we can obtain relief, and the available
forms of relief (for example, damages, injunction, or specific perform-
ance). 65 In the absence of any such rules, the "rights" are an empty
shell. The libertarians argue for absolute rights, which are defined as
protection against and compensation for any harm caused by an actual or
threatened invasion of the boundary around one's person or nominal
property. 66 The rights defined by actual tort law are much less absolute
but still quite extensive. Briefly (and very roughly), we can obtain com-
pensation for harm that is caused to our persons or nominal property by
the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct, and also protection
against such harm if the tortious conduct is unreasonable, subject to cer-
tain fairly narrow proximate-cause and damage limitations. 67
It makes no sense to state that application of the Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency criterion "maximizes the value of the rights" as so defined. What
is maximized is aggregate social wealth, rather than the rights of any indi-
vidual. For example, under the efficiency interpretations of negligence
and nuisance, the "rights" of an individual in her person or property can
be taken, without compensation or consent, and given to someone else if
they are worth more to that other person, measured by the amoral stan-
63. Id. at 524-25, 547, 549-50, 551; accord G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24-26, 291-308 (student ed. 1970); see Wright, Bane, supra note
2, at 436-37 n.7.
64. Cooter, supra note 1, at 549-50, 551; see id. at 524.
65. Coleman & Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1340-47
(1986).
66. R. NOZICK, supra note 43, at ix, 30-35, 57-78; Epstein, supra note 4, at 152, 163. 168-69,
192, 198, 203-04.
67. See supra text accompanying note 7.
UNSCIENTIFIC FORMALISM AND FALSE SEMANTICS
dard of willingness-to-pay (remember that payment is not actually re-
quired). Such "rights" are ephemeral. Moreover, such ephemeral rights,
subject to being appropriated at any time by a "higher-value" use, under-
mine the stability of entitlements which Cooter concedes is necessary for
the efficiency theory. 68 On the other hand, if the rights specified by tradi-
tional tort law are taken seriously, there is no room for the social-wealth-
maximizing redistributions that are called for by the efficiency theory.
Liberty and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are fundamentally opposed. The
concepts of liberty and rights are foreign to the efficiency theory. They
can be accommodated in that theory only by an invalid redefinition of
the concepts. 69
IV. THE FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE CAUSATION
REQUIREMENT
The usual argument offered for the efficiency theory is not its nor-
mative appeal (it has none), but rather its alleged success in describing
and predicting the actual decisions of the courts. 70  This argument has
recently been reduced to a claim that efficiency theory explains and
predicts most of tort law, since some "anomalies" are admitted to exist.7 1
Clearly, however, the causation requirement cannot be dismissed as such
an anomaly, since it is a central, pervasive element of tort liability.72 The
legal economists therefore have expended considerable effort on attempts
to demonstrate that the causation requirement is consistent with the effi-
ciency theory.
Cooter provides a brief summary of these attempts which, for the
most part, does not indicate their true nature and the extent of their fail-
ure. Thus, he indicates that Guido Calabresi finds the (but-for) causation
requirement useful as a cost-accounting device in the overall search for
68. Cooter, supra note 1, at 548 & n.60; see Wright, Economic Theories, supra note 53, at 10-
13, 23-25. Cooter assumes that preferences ("tastes") and technology remain stable. Cooter, supra,
at 543, 548.
69. Posner, like Cooter, argues that rights might be (re)defined using the efficiency criterion.
Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187,
188, 190-91, 201-06 (1981). But (1) this would make the supposed "rights" ephemeral and (2) actual
tort rights are not so defined, as the rest of this comment should make clear.
70. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 47, at xiv-xv; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.3,
at 12-14, § 2.1, at 16-17, § 2.2, at 17-19, § 2.3, at 20-21, § 8.1, at 179-81 (2d ed. 1977); Kitch, The
Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics, " 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 196 (1983); Rubin, supra
note 52, at 320-22.
71. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 8-9, 19, 23-24, 27-
28, 312-14 (1987); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 2.2, at 21, § 2.3, at 23-24 (3d ed.
1986).
72. Wright, Causation, supra note 5.
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the "cheapest cost avoider," 73 but he fails to note that (as Calabresi him-
self states) other devices would be more useful, that the alleged actuarial
utility of the causation requirement is nonexistent, and that Calabresi
ultimately renews his earlier claim that the causation requirement is
neither intelligible nor efficient. 74
Cooter notes that John Brown's article on tort liability does not ex-
plicitly deal with the causation requirement, but he incorrectly states that
Brown implicitly uses the concept of "probabilistic cause," according to
which a condition is treated as a cause of an injury if it increased the risk
of the injury. 75 Brown uses assumed functional relationships between
types of precaution and types of injury to define the efficient level of pre-
caution. He properly analyzes the risks in the tortious-conduct inquiry,
rather than in the causal inquiry. When he addresses the causal issue, he
assumes that a person is only liable for harm which is actually caused by
her activity, and that she is liable regardless of her level of precaution in
strict liability but only if her level of precaution was negligent in negli-
gence liability. 76
Contrary to Cooter's claim, 77 Brown shows that, in the usual bilat-
eral-precaution case, the two parties will achieve the efficient levels of
precaution only if the court (1) correctly identifies the efficient level for at
least one of them and (2) subjects her to (negligence) liability if, and only
if, she fails to achieve that level. In a semi-ideal world of perfect infor-
mation and risk-neutrality, there allegedly are a number of efficient rules.
In the real world of imperfect information and risk aversion, there are
none.
78
Cooter implies that Steven. Shavell's analysis of causation dealt only
with "probabilistic causation," notes Shavell's conclusion that "there is a
close, but imperfect correspondence between the [causal requirements] in
tort law and the scope of liability required to achieve economic effi-
ciency," and observes, rather opaquely, that, "[i]f there is a close fit be-
tween legal cause and economic efficiency, the court will say that a
defendant caused the accident when his behavior was inefficient, but not
73. Cooter, supra note 1, at 532-33 & n.28.
74. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 85-87, 105-08; Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 436-42.
75. Cooter, supra note 1, at 534; see supra note 28 and text accompanying notes 25-28.
76. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 325-28 (1973).
However, like other legal economists, Brown incorrectly assumes that a person who has behaved
tortiously is liable for any harm caused by her activity, whereas in fact she is liable only for harm
that was caused by the tortious aspect of her activity. Id. at 328-29: see Wright, Causation, supra
note 5, at 1759-74 & n.104.
77. Cooter, supra note 1, at 533-34.
78. Brown, supra note 76, at 323-24, 333-34, 337-44, 346-47; see sources cited infra note 106.
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otherwise."' 79 There is no discussion of Shavell's claim that the actual-
causation requirement can be logically "deduced" from the Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency criterion.8
0
In another article, I have shown that Shavell's argument relies on
unrealistic assumptions, contrived illustrations, faulty mathematical
proofs, and, most importantly, a confusion of forward-looking risk analy-
sis with backward-looking causal analysis. When these flaws are cor-
rected, Shavell's discussion demonstrates the reverse of what he intends:
that the causation requirement is inexplicable under the efficiency
theory. 8
1
Finally, Cooter notes Landes and Posner's assertions that the con-
cept of causation has no inherent meaning, that causal attributions by
courts are merely implicit efficiency judgments, and that the concept of
causation therefore can be dispensed with by the economically literate.8 2
Again, Cooter does not present the arguments underlying these asser-
tions. The basic argument is that all the decisions which are thought to
turn on causal analysis can be explained by ex ante risk analysis. But, as
I have demonstrated elsewhere, Landes and Posner actually rely on ex
post causal analysis, while claiming to rely solely on ex ante risk
analysis. 83
For example, Landes and Posner discuss a case, Weeks v. Mc-
Nulty,8 4 in which the defendant, McNulty, failed to install the statutorily
required fire escapes in his hotel. The victim, Weeks, died in the hotel as
a result of a fire. The court concluded that McNulty was not liable, since
the evidence proved that Weeks would not have tried to use the fire es-
capes even if they had been installed: a but-for causal rationale. Landes
and Posner argue: "Evidence that the fire escapes would not have
averted Weeks' death means . . . the probability of his death was in-
dependent of whether or not a violation occurred ... and hence that due
care with respect to [installing fire escapes] was zero."' 85 This clearly is an
ex post causal analysis masquerading as an ex ante risk analysis. The
failure to install the fire escapes increased the ex ante risk of injury to
every guest in the hotel, including Weeks, although as it turned out it did
not contribute to Weeks' death.8 6
79. Cooter, supra note 1, at 534-36.
80. Shavell, supra note 8, at 465-66.
81. Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 444-52.
82. Cooter, supra note 1, at 540.
83. Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 452-55 (criticizing Landes & Posner, supra note 8).
84. 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S.W. 809 (1898).
85. Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 115-16.
86. Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 453-54.
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In response to my criticism, Landes and Posner continue to insist
that they are using ex ante risk analysis rather than ex post causal analy-
sis in the Weeks case:
[Wright's] criticism is incorrect. The point is that the owner's careless-
ness did not in fact make it more likely ex ante that Weeks would die,
given the particular circumstances of the fire. For we know, although
after the fact, that even if the hotel owner had been careful, Weeks
would have died anyway. 87
I presume everyone (except Landes and Posner) will recognize that
the owner's carelessness clearly did make it more likely, ex ante, that any
resident of the hotel, including Weeks, would die in a hotel fire (indeed,
Landes and Posner implicitly admit this by referring to "the owner's
carelessness"). Moreover, the last sentence in the quotation obviously is
not an ex ante risk analysis, but rather an explicit application of the ex
post but-for test of causation. Similarly, when Landes and Posner at-
tempt to rebut my claim that they inconsistently restrict or abandon their
ex post due-care approach in other cases, they simply repeat their incon-
sistent failure to follow the approach.88
In sum, the legal economists have been unable to reconcile the ex
post focus of the causation requirement with the ex ante focus of the
efficiency theory. They therefore have adopted two last-ditch tactics. As
Cooter candidly notes, the first tactic is to disparage the concept of cau-
sation by asserting that it is incoherent and meaningless. This paves the
way for arguments that the concept of causation should be replaced by,
or used as a cover for, efficiency judgments. 89 The second tactic is to
proclaim what obviously is not true-that mere creation of increased risk
of harm constitutes causation of the harm ("probabilistic causation")-
so that efficiency theory, which relies on analyses of ex ante risk, alleg-
edly is consistent with the causation requirement after all.90
We have already seen that the second tactic is untenable. 91 The first
tactic also has failed. Even in the absence of a comprehensive definition,
the concept of causation had enough substance to withstand the efforts of
Calabresi, Landes, Posner, and Shavell to co-opt it or eliminate it.92
Now a comprehensive definition has been provided (the NESS test)
which, as I have shown in a prior article, explains-as the economists
87. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 71, at 235.
88. Id. at 238.
89. Cooter, supra note 1, at 527-28. 531-34, 540; see Calabresi, supra note 8, at 86-87 & nn.23 &
24, 106-08; Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 109-10; Schwartz, supra note 8. at 640. 646 & n.20.
90. See sources cited supra note 28.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74. 79-88.
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have been unable to-the actual decisions of the courts. 93
However, the legal economists are unwilling to admit that the game
is up. In this symposium, both Cooter and Schwartz fail to confront the
merits of the NESS test, preferring instead to repeat the refrain that there
is no workable concept of causation. 94 Similarly, although Landes and
Posner describe my prior article as "a comprehensive and up-to-date sur-
vey of legal doctrine" (a plug for which I am indeed grateful), they do
not mention the NESS test that is elaborated in that article, but rather
also continue to assert that there is no workable concept of causation. 95
V. THE FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE PROBLEM CASES
Throughout the above discussion, I have argued that the traditional
corrective-justice view of tort law explains the courts' actual decisions,
both on the substance of the causation requirement and the evidentiary
requirements for proving causation, while the efficiency view does not.
In this final section, I will document that claim more thoroughly by ex-
amining the various types of "problem cases" that Cooter discusses in his
attempt to demonstrate the utility of the efficiency theory.
A. Overdetermined Causation
Cooter asserts that, under the efficiency theory, there should be no
liability in cases of causal overdetermination-for example, when each of
two fires is independently sufficient to burn down a house, and either one
fire arrives first and destroys the house before the other fire arrives or
they merge and together destroy the house. Cooter and the other legal
economists argue that a defendant who tortiously and independently
started one of the fires should not be liable, since "[t]he law should not
create incentives to waste resources attempting to avoid the inevitable."'96
This is poor economics and incorrect law.
Economically, behavior should be evaluated in terms of the expected
consequences at the time that the defendant acted. When the defendant
tortiously starts his fire, the other fire is not known or foreseen, so ex ante
the destruction of the house is not inevitable. To create appropriate ex
ante incentives, the defendant should be held liable (this is especially
93. Wright, Causation. supra note 5; see infra text accompanying notes 96-124.
94. Cooter, supra note 1, at 526-28; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 643-44 & n.12, 646 & n.20: see
supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
95. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 71, at 228 & n.1; see Landes & Posner, supra note 8,
at 109.
96. Cooter, supra note 1, at 536-37; accord Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 116-18; Shavell,
supra note 8, at 472-73 (ex. 3), 477-78 (ex. 6), 494-95.
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clear when both fires were tortiously set). 97 From a noneconomic, ex
post perspective, it might have been wasteful to prevent or put out only
one of the two fires, but it would not have been wasteful to require the
defendant (alone or in conjunction with the person, if any, who started
the other fire) to prevent or put out both of the fires.
Thus, it would seem that the defendant should always be held liable,
whether or not his fire was a cause of the destruction of the house. How-
ever, there is a counterargument that, absent collusion, the defendant
should never be held liable in this type of case: since causal overdetermi-
nation is typically rare and unforeseeable, excluding these cases from the
scope of liability allegedly will have a minimal effect on ex ante incentives
but will reduce litigation costs. 98
The law does not conform with either of these economic arguments.
Defendants are often but not always held liable in these types of cases, on
traditional corrective-justice grounds. No matter how unreasonable or
inefficient the defendant's conduct may have been, he is not held liable if
his fire was not a cause of the injury. If his fire was a cause of the injury,
he will be held liable unless the other fire was a nonresponsible condition
(for example, an act of God which was not covered by insurance), in
which case the plaintiff's corrective-justice claim-that he would not
have been injured if not for the tortious conduct of others-fails. The
NESS test accurately identifies the causes. For example, when one fire
arrives first and destroys the house before the other fire arrives, the first
fire is a preemptive cause of the destruction of the house and the second
fire is not a cause but rather a preempted condition. On the other hand,
when the fires merge and together destroy the house, each fire is a dupli-
cative cause of the destruction of the house.99
B. Lack of Causation
When there is no overdetermined-causation problem, the legal econ-
omists argue that a defendant who creates an inefficient risk should be
held liable whether or not the risk results in harm. °° Thus, Cooter and
97. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 646 n.20.
98. Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 116-17; Shavell, supra note 8, at 493-94. This argument
is undercut by the fact that, precisely because these cases are rare, the alleged reduction in litigation
costs also will be minimal. Rizzo, supra note 8, at 1036; see Shavell, supra, at 483. Moreover, much
greater litigation costs may be incurred in disputes over this limitation in a significant number of
cases. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
99. Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 445-48; Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1791-96, 1798-
99.
100. E.g., Calabresi, supra note 8, at 79-81, 98; cf Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 110, 112-14,
121-25 (liability based on ex ante analysis of risk rather than ex post causation); Shavell, supra note
8, at 472-81 (same).
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Schwartz assert that, to provide the appropriate incentive to give warn-
ings, a defendant who fails to provide required warnings to the plaintiff
should be held liable for the plaintiff's subsequent injury whether or not
the failure to warn contributed to the injury.10' This is a proper conclu-
sion under the legal economists' ex ante risk analysis, although Landes,
Posner, and Shavell duck it by confusing ex ante risk analysis with ex
post causal analysis. 102
Landes, Posner, and Shavell's ploys are understandable. The deci-
sions of the courts clearly disagree with the efficiency view and instead
follow the traditional corrective-justice view of tort liability: no causa-
tion, no liability.10 3 Contrary to Schwartz's assertion, ordinary moral
sentiments, and the law which expresses those sentiments, are a reproach
to the efficiency theory, not the corrective-justice theory. 104
C. Intervening Causes and the "Wrong Hazard"
These are proximate-cause issues rather than causal issues. The
question is whether a defendant who tortiously caused a particular harm
should be absolved from liability because of intervening causes or be-
cause the harm is not the type of hazard the foreseeability of which made
the defendant's conduct tortious.
Cooter asserts that the intervening-cause cases are no different than
the cases involving bilateral precaution by the plaintiff and the defendant,
and that "a standard conclusion" is that the efficient result can be
achieved "in principle" in the latter cases through some form of negli-
gence rule as opposed to a strict liability rule. 0 5 But the standard ac-
count is that a number of liability rules, including strict-liability rules
101. Cooter, supra note 1, at 537; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 644; see id. at 646 n.20 (liability for
preempted condition). Cooter would not impose liability if it were certain ex ante that the warning
would not have any effect.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 79-88; Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 444-55.
103. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236-41 (4th ed. 1971); Wright,
Causation, supra note 5, passim. Schwartz implies that the courts do not adhere to the causation
requirement in the failure-to-warn cases. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 644 & n.13. However, in the
cases that he cites, the judges stress that the causation requirement still applies. Recognizing the
speculative and self-serving nature of testimony on this issue, the judges create a reasonable, rebutta-
ble presumption that a proper warning would have been read and heeded if it had been given. There
is no liability if it is proven that a proper warning would not have been read or heeded. Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1279-82 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App.
1975), rev'd, 265 Ind. 457, 462-65, 358 N.E.2d 974, 977-78 (1976) (inadequate findings on causa-
tion); see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972) (to avoid post hoc self-serving speculation, causal issue resolved by using objective test of
what a reasonable person would have done if warned; burden of proof remains on plaintiff).
104. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 647; see id. at 643-45, 646 n.20.
105. Cooter, supra note 1, at 537-38 & n.41.
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with some form of negligence defense, will lead both the plaintiff and the
defendant to achieve the efficient result in a semi-ideal world of perfect
information and risk-neutrality, while no rule will achieve the efficient
result in the real world of imperfect information and risk aversion. 10 6
How then is efficiency theory helpful on the choice of a rule?
Moreover, even in a semi-ideal world, each rule works in the plain-
tiff-defendant context only because the party who does not bear the ulti-
mate residual liability is potentially fully liable if he is negligent.
Therefore he has the proper incentive not to be negligent. 0 7 In the inter-
vening-cause cases, the issue is whether the defendant should be free of
liability even though he was negligent and his negligence was a cause of
the injury. Thus, contrary to Cooter's claim, these cases do raise special
problems that are not present in the plaintiff-defendant context. To ab-
solve the negligent defendant from liability because of an intervening
(human or natural) cause would seem to remove the needed incentive not
to be negligent.
The usual economic prescription for the intervening-cause and
"wrong hazard" cases is identical to the one for the overdetermined-cau-
sation cases: absolve the negligent defendant from liability if the inter-
vening cause was unforeseeable or if the harm was the "wrong hazard,"
since excluding these cases from the scope of liability allegedly will re-
duce litigation costs without having any adverse effect on incentives. 08
But both parts of this argument seem clearly to be wrong. First, the
resources devoted to the foreseeability issue in all the cases which are
106. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 47, at 37-49; W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 71, at 54-
84; Brown, supra note 76, at 323-24, 333-34, 337-44, 346-47; Wright, Economic Theories, supra note
53. at 15-28.
107. See sources cited supra note 106.
108. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 81, 87-88, 91-100; Cooter, supra note 1, at 538; Grady, Proxi-
mate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 440, 449 (1984); Landes & Posner,
supra note 8, at 125-33; Shavell, supra note 8, at 492-93, 497-98; see supra text accompanying note
98. Shavell asserts that it is not low probability per se which is relevant, but the defendant's lower
subjective estimate of probability compared to the court's in these types of cases, which allegedly
justifies absolving the defendant from liability to save administrative costs. Shavell, supra, at 490-91,
500. Shavell's psychological assumptions are doubtful. COMMITTEE ON RISK AND DECISIONMAK-
ING, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AND DECISIONMAKING: PERSPECTIVES AND RE-
SEARCH 11-12, 15-17 (1982) (people often underestimate probability of usual events and
overestimate probability of unusual events). Moreover, he does not explain why the court would not
also underestimate these risks, nor why the court should eliminate liability entirely rather than just
reducing its estimate to that of the defendant. He himself notes that the court would have to probe
the subjective state of mind of the defendant in each case (how then are administrative costs saved?),
and that use of subjective estimates would reduce the defendant's incentive to become better in-
formed on risks. Shavell, supra, at 492, 500. Finally, it is clear that the courts do not do what
Shavell suggests, but rather rely on objective assessments of risk. W. PROSSER, supra note 103, § 32,
at 149-51, § 43, at 250-51. See also Rizzo, supra note 8, at 1036-37 & nn.120 & 122 (criticizing
Shavell's argument).
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litigated would almost surely outweigh the reduction in litigation costs
due to the few cases, if any, which are not litigated because of the foresee-
ability limitation. Second, the foreseeability limitation will have adverse
incentive effects. With the limitation, potential defendants will have an
incentive to avoid research on risks to others and to conceal risk informa-
tion that is not generally known (as has occurred in many of the "toxic
tort" cases). Without it, they will have a better incentive to engage in
efficient research on risks and less incentive to conceal data on risks.'0 9
In any event, once again the actual practice of the courts is not con-
sistent with either the legal economists' standard prescription (the fore-
seeability limitation) or the alternative prescription (no foreseeability
limitation). Although much work remains to be done in this area, the
work that has been done strongly suggests that the decisions are consis-
tent with the traditional corrective-justice view.
The decisions which deny liability for harm that was "outside the
risk" ("wrong hazard") are usually based on a failure to meet the tor-
tious-aspect causation requirement.1 0 Conversely, when the tortious-as-
pect causation requirement is satisfied, the courts often impose liability
even though the injury was unforeseeable or was "outside the risk.""'
The scope of liability varies with the type and degree of the defendant's
tortious conduct. 112 Liability ordinarily is denied if the injury would
have occurred anyway as a result of nonresponsible conditions, 1 3 or if it
would not have occurred if not for unforeseeable tortious conduct by
others or independent abnormal conditions.' 14
109. Wright, Bane, supra note 2, at 442-44.
110. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1759-74.
111. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 177-85 (1927); HART & HONORt, supra
note 4, at 176-78, 254-90; R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 28-32, 39, 49-54, 60-
78, 96-97, 100-03, 109-10, 117 (1963); W. PROSSER, supra note 103, §§ 43-44, at 250-80; Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (pts. 1-3), 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 127-28, 233-52, 321-27(1911-1912).
112. The scope of liability is greatest for the intentional torts, less for negligence, and least for
strict liability, as would be expected under the morality-based corrective-justice scheme. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 103, § 43, at 250-70, § 79, at 517-22; Watermeyer, Causation and Legal Re-
sponsibility (pts. 1 & 2), 58 S. AFR. L.J. 232, 248-62 (1941), 62 S. AFR. L.J. 126, 132-45 (1945)
(author identified in HART & HONORI, supra note 4, at 303). Landes and Posner's effort to explain
the varying scope of liability assumes that the probability of unforeseeable injury is higher and the
administrative costs are lower in the intentional and strict-liability cases, compared to the negligence
cases, which would seem to imply an equivalent scope of liability in the intentional and strict-liability
cases, greater than the scope in negligence. Yet they assert that the scope of liability should be
greatest in the intentional cases and equivalent in the negligence and strict-liability cases. Landes &
Posner, supra note 8, at 133-34. Either way, they have failed to describe the actual practice.
113. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1798-1801; see supra text accompanying note 99.
114. HART & HONORI, supra note 4, passim; Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proxi-
mate Cause (pt. 3), 20 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1932); Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1745-50, 1774
n.161.
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D. Causal Uncertainty
The last type of case discussed by Cooter includes all those cases in
which the defendant tortiously exposed the plaintiff to a risk of injury of
a sort which subsequently occurred (or may yet occur), but it is (or will
be) impossible to determine whether or not the defendant's tortious con-
duct contributed to the plaintiff's injury. This type of case includes
many of the mass-exposure "toxic-tort" cases as well as the more conven-
tional "increased-risk" or "reduced-chance" cases. It has become the
major exhibit against the traditional corrective-justice view and the ma-
jor support for the specious concept of "probabilistic causation."" 5
The legal economists argue that the liability problem in this type of
case is easily solved under the efficiency view by using "probabilistic cau-
sation" (ex ante or ex post risk assessments) to assign liability for the
actual injury to each tortious defendant in proportion to her share of the
total risk. 16 They do not explain why in these cases "probabilistic cau-
sation" results in only partial liability while in other cases in which it
allegedly is applied it results in full liability, or why ex post probabilities
and actual injuries are often used when from the standpoint of ex ante
incentives the ex ante expected harm should be used. "17 They also fail to
take into account the duplicative effects of independent risks or the mag-
nified effects of synergistic risks." 8 These effects cannot be apportioned
in any way that will produce efficient incentives." t9
In contrast, there is no conceptual barrier to recovery in these types
of cases under the traditional corrective-justice view. All that is required
is that the courts recognize a new type of injury in such cases-risk expo-
sure per se or risk exposure which possibly led to the subsequent injury.
115. Cooter, supra note 1, at 539; Kelman, supra note 36, at 579-80, 597-600; Landes & Posner,
supra note 8, at 121-24 & n.33; Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious
Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984); Schwartz, supra note 8, at
640, 644-47 & n.14.
116. See sources cited supra note 115 (Cooter, Landes & Posner, and Schwartz).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 100-02.
118. For example, Shavell's proof of the efficiency of the risk-apportionment approach assumes,
among other things, that there are no duplicative or synergistic effects. Shavell, Uncertainty Over
Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 590, 591, 600 n.25 (1985).
119. Kelman, supra note 36, at 608-17; R. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Re-
sponsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Manifested Injury and
Risk-Exposure (November 1987) (unpublished manuscript, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law).
Schwartz misreads Kelman as having concluded that only the efficiency theory resolves the risk-
apportionment issue satisfactorily. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 646 n.20. Actually, Kelman focuses
primarily on the incentive issues, argues that the risks cannot be apportioned to achieve efficient
incentives, and makes a few minimally supported remarks about the inability of the corrective-justice
view to apportion the risks in a conceptually compelling or rights-respecting manner. See infra text
accompanying note 124.
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The plaintiff would still have to prove that the defendant contributed to
the risk-exposure. This approach greatly improves the liability analysis
by clarifying the basic policy issue (should risk-exposure be recognized as
a legal injury in certain types of cases?) and distinguishing it from the
causal issue, whereas the "probabilistic causation" approach, by treating
the policy issue as a causal issue, fails to address the policy issue explic-
itly and confuses mere increased risk with causation. 120
Some courts seem to have implicitly adopted the "probabilistic cau-
sation" approach in these types of cases.' 2' However, the most recent,
better-reasoned decisions, which have explicitly considered both ap-
proaches, are clearly settling on the traditional corrective-justice ap-
proach as the proper approach, 22 despite the complaints of some
commentators who mistakenly adhere to the concept of "probabilistic
causation."'' 23 There is a well-established method for allocating injuries
that can be applied to the new injury of risk-exposure: allocate to each
party the risk of the harm's occurring solely through her activity, and
allocate the duplicative or synergistic portion of the risk to all the parties
120. Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1809-21; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 6, pt. V.
121. E.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984); Rober-
son v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d
405 (1984); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aff'd mem.,
37 N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975); Thornton v. CAMC, Etc., 305 S.E.2d
316, 323-25 (W. Va. 1983). Each court claims to be adhering to the traditional evidentiary stan-
dards. Some admit that this approach is merely a covert method for allowing juries to award dam-
ages for risk-exposure, rather than for the manifested injury. E.g., Thompson, 141 Ariz. at 608, 688
P.2d at 616. Each opinion relies on ambiguous dicta in Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632
(4th Cir. 1966). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which decided Hicks, recently has
rejected the "probabilistic causation" approach, affirmed that risk-exposure is the relevant legal in-
jury, and insisted that causation of the risk-exposure injury must be proven in accordance with the
traditional evidentiary standards. Waffen v. United States, 799 F.2d 911, 917-19, 922-23 (4th Cir.
1986).
122. E.g.. Waffen, 799 F.2d at 917-19, 922-23 (see description supra note 121); DeBurkarte v.
Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 135-38 (Iowa 1986); Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 456-53, 525 A.2d
643, 648-50 (1987) (proof of increased risk of death may be allowed in action for risk-exposure, but is
insufficient to establish causation in action for death itself); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99
Wash. 2d 609, 619-36, 664 P.2d 474, 479-87 (1983) (Pearson, Stafford, and Utter, JJ., and Williams,
C.J., concurring specially, reject mere increased risk as proof of causation of actual injury, but would
allow recovery for risk-exposure as legal injury); see id. at 610-619, 664 P.2d at 474-79 (Dore, J.,
joined only by Rossellini, J., delivering opinion of the court, which allows mere increased risk to be
used to establish causation of actual injury, but limits damages to those caused by increased risk,
such as "premature death"); id. at 636-42, 642-45, 664 P.2d at 487-91, 491-92 (Brachtenbach and
Dimmick, JJ. dissenting, and Dolliver, J., dissenting, reject mere increased risk as proof of causation
of actual injury); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191 & n.10, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 & n.10,
cert. denied sub nora. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (risk-exposure which
possibly led to actual injury is compensable legal injury). For earlier cases, see O'Brien v. Stover,
443 F.2d 1013. 1018-19 (8th Cir. 1971); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 586-87 (N.D. Cal.
1980). See generally Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 6. § V(A).
123. F. HARPER, F. JAMES, JR. & 0. GRAY, supra note 27. § 20.2. at 174 (Supp. 1987) (com-
menting on Waffen).
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who contribute to the duplicative or synergistic portion under a rule of
joint and several liability. This method holds each tortious defendant
fully responsible for the risk that she created but does not overcompen-
sate the plaintiff, in accordance with the traditional corrective-justice
view of tort law. 124
In sum, the efficiency theory does not account for the courts' deci-
sions in any of these types of cases, while the traditional corrective-justice
theory accounts for all of them. Once again, the efficiency theory fails to
match reality and thus is less scientific than the corrective-justice theory.
CONCLUSION
The legal economists like to assert that the efficiency theory explains
the decisions of the courts and that no other theory has been proposed
which claims to do so. In this comment, I have challenged both asser-
tions, by relying on the theory that has always dominated mainstream
legal thought. This theory is not (as Kelman asserts) either libertarian-
ism or the efficiency theory (which, in conjunction with Kelman's Criti-
cal Legal Studies, dominate fashionable academic thought), 25 but rather
the traditional but still vital corrective-justice theory.
We are now in a position to answer Cooter's opening query, but
with a much different answer than he gives.126 The disappearance of the
causation requirement from the efficiency theory and its replacement
with mathematical functions, which indicate but do not describe ex ante
risk that is misleadingly referred to as "probabilistic causation," is
neither scientific progress nor a cause for celebration. The efficiency the-
ory conceals and distorts fundamental legal, moral, and philosophic is-
sues, through an habitual misuse of language and a false appearance of
scientific rigor. Tort law is not, and could not be, the union of liberty
and efficiency, since the two concepts are fundamentally irreconcilable.
The efficiency theory has no room for individual rights and individual
responsibility. Thus tort law, which is an expression of individual rights
and individual responsibility, has no room for the efficiency theory.
124. R. Wright, supra note 119. There should be a provision for contribution among the defend-
ants, based on comparative responsibility, for the joint-and-several-liability portion of the damages.
Id.; Wright, Causation, supra note 5, at 1798-1801 & n.265.
125. Kelman, supra note 36, at 580.
126. Cooter, supra note 1, at 523-25, 551.
